Cost as an Independent Variable: A Study of its Continued Use by Aeronautical Systems Center\u27s Programs and their Contractors to Set and Maintain Cost Objectives by Codrington, Kevin W.
Air Force Institute of Technology 
AFIT Scholar 
Theses and Dissertations Student Graduate Works 
3-2006 
Cost as an Independent Variable: A Study of its Continued Use by 
Aeronautical Systems Center's Programs and their Contractors to 
Set and Maintain Cost Objectives 
Kevin W. Codrington 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.afit.edu/etd 
 Part of the Finance and Financial Management Commons, and the Government Contracts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Codrington, Kevin W., "Cost as an Independent Variable: A Study of its Continued Use by Aeronautical 
Systems Center's Programs and their Contractors to Set and Maintain Cost Objectives" (2006). Theses 
and Dissertations. 3321. 
https://scholar.afit.edu/etd/3321 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Graduate Works at AFIT Scholar. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AFIT Scholar. For more 














































COST AS AN INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: 
A STUDY OF ITS CONTINUED USE BY AERONAUTICAL SYSTEMS 









 DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 
AIR UNIVERSITY 
AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
 
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio 
 


























The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official 
































COST AS AN INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: 
A STUDY OF ITS CONTINUED USE BY AERONAUTICAL SYSTEMS 








Presented to the Faculty 
 
Department of Systems and Engineering Management 
 
Graduate School of Engineering and Management 
 




Air Education and Training Command 
 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the 
 




















COST AS AN INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: 
A STUDY OF ITS CONTINUED USE BY AERONAUTICAL SYSTEMS 















    Approved: 
 
 
                 
  
                               /signed/                   10 March 2006 




                               /signed/                   09 March 2006




                               /signed/                   10 March 2006





The purpose of this research was to assess whether Aeronautical Systems Center’s 
(ASC’s) acquisition professionals believe Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV) has 
enabled their programs and contractors to set and maintain cost objectives.  The three 
major objectives of this thesis are to answer the following questions:  First, Do ASC’s 
acquisition professionals believe their programs are setting and maintaining cost 
objectives?  Second, Do ASC’s acquisition professionals believe their contractors are 
setting and maintaining cost objectives?  Last, what is the practitioners’ perspective of 
CAIV?  This research identified CAIV as being well received by DoD.  It also identified 
that ASC’s acquisition professionals believe their programs and contractors are setting 
and maintaining cost objectives.  Through synthesis of the interview answers, a few 
unexpected practitioners’ perspectives emerged as conclusions.  First, there are no 
incentives for DoD programs to implement CAIV.  Second, limited accountability is 
placed on programs to utilize CAIV.  Third, CAIV has lost most of its momentum.  
Fourth, DoD has substituted “budget” for “cost” in CAIV.  Last, a window of opportunity 
might be on the horizon to reintroduce a new and improved CAIV.  
This research adds to the body of work being done to comprehend the ever-
changing DoD acquisition system, enhancing the knowledge base of DoD acquisition 
professionals.  Additionally, this study provides insight into a long serving DoD initiative 
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COST AS AN INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:  A STUDY OF ITS CONTINUED USE 
BY AERONAUTICAL SYSTEMS CENTER’S PROGRAMS AND THEIR 
CONTRACTORS TO SET AND MAINTAIN COST OBJECTIVES 
I. Introduction 
Background 
 It is common knowledge the Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition process is 
plagued by cost and schedule overruns.  DOD is facing a cascading number of problems 
in managing its acquisitions.  Cost increases incurred while developing new weapon 
systems mean DoD cannot produce as many of those weapons as intended nor can it be 
relied on to deliver to the warfighter when promised (GAO, 2005).  To counter this 
problem, numerous initiatives have been developed and deployed.  About 10 years ago, 
one of the most publicized initiatives came about, Cost as an Independent Variable 
(CAIV). 
Between 1986 and 1995 there was an approximately 30% decrease, in 2005 
constant dollars, in DoD’s budget (Defense Authorization and Appropriations Bill, 2005).  
This fact forced DoD to take actions to improve its acquisition efficiency, making every 
dollar count.  With the introduction of CAIV, all participants in the acquisition system are 
expected to recognize the reality of fiscal constraints and take action to reduce cost.  Cost 
in this context refers to Lifecycle cost, which according to CAIV principles should be 
treated as equally important to performance and schedule (DoD Directive 5000.1, 2003).  
CAIV is a methodology for reducing Total Ownership Cost (TOC).  It involves 
developing, setting, and refining aggressive unit production cost objectives and Operation 
and Sustainment (O&S) cost objectives while meeting warfighter requirements.  To 
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achieve the best outcome for all parties, it is essential to involve the user community in 
the tradeoff process from the earliest concept development activities.  But like any good 
investment, applying CAIV is not free.  It is necessary to invest resources to perform the 
tradeoff analyses required in the up-front requirement generation process.  One of the 
most important aspects of making CAIV a success is investing in the training of key 
personnel and making sure the CAIV process is understood (Cost as an Independent 
Variable, 2002).  
Former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
(USD AT&L) E.C. Aldridge established CAIV’s implementation as one of his key 
metrics under his first acquisition goal, “achieve credibility and effectiveness in the 
acquisition and logistics support process.”  Under this goal, he approved a metric that 
required, by the end of FY02, 100% of defense programs to incorporate a CAIV plan and 
to have an evolutionary acquisition or spiral development plan in place.  These plans are 
discrete parts of each Acquisition Category One (ACAT I) program’s acquisition strategy 
and will be executed and updated throughout the acquisition cycle. 
CAIV is not just for ACAT 1 programs, it applies to all programs and throughout 
all acquisition phases including modifications and upgrades.  However, the greatest 
single point of leverage for CAIV to positively influence program requirements, TOC, 
schedule, and performance is at the beginning of a program's life.  CAIV requires the user 
and requirement communities to jointly explore cost, performance, and schedule tradeoffs 
in an effort to reduce Live Cycle Cost (LCC).  Efforts having potential benefits should be 
refined as the program progresses (Cost as an Independent Variable, 2002) The 
fundamental purpose of CAIV can be summed up as providing program managers, with 
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the blessing of all stakeholders, the flexibility to make sensible trade-offs between the 
major acquisition cornerstones of cost, schedule, and technical performance to produce a 
system with reduced LCC. 
Problem Statement 
 Though DoD put forward several cost saving techniques, few have been 
exceptionally successful.  Over the years, the acquisition community implemented 
Design to Cost (DTC), Performance-Based Service Acquisition, and CAIV initiatives.  
DTC became a well established initiative in DoD acquisition in the early 1970s.  It is 
summarized as “a process utilizing unit cost goals as threshold for managers and as 
design parameters for engineers” (Joint Design to Cost Guide, 1973).  With not much 
success as a cost saving initiative, DTC met its end in 1995 as a result of the dramatic 
cancellation of military standards and DoD’s new focus on cost.  In many circles, DTC is 
considered to be the forerunner to CAIV.  The Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition and Technology, Dr. Paul Kaminski formally introduced CAIV in a 1995 
memorandum to the Secretaries of the Military Department. 
This research assesses whether Aeronautical Systems Center’s (ASC’s) 
acquisition professionals believe CAIV has enabled their programs and contractors to set 
and maintain cost objectives.  It also tries to get a glimpse into the practitioners’ 
perspective of CAIV 
Research Objectives  
The three major objective of this thesis are to answer the following questions.  
First, Do ASC’s acquisition professionals believe their programs are setting and 
maintaining cost objectives?  Second, Do ASC’s acquisition professionals believe their 
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contractors are setting and maintaining cost objectives?  Last, what is the practitioners’ 
perspective of CAIV?   
To accomplish the first two objectives, ASC’s employees were interviewed using 
a reformatted version of an instrument created by the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(OSD).  “CAIV’s Metrics and Observables” were developed by the CAIV working 
group, commissioned by Dr. Kaminski through the Defense Manufacturing Council.  
This tool was designed to identify important and observable steps which should be 
implemented in setting aggressive production and O&S cost objectives and then 
managing for their achievement (Kaminski, 1995).  The instrument does this by asking 
the following questions:  1) Are cost objectives defined and consistent with requirements 
programmed and projected fiscal resources?  2) Is DoD managing to achieve cost 
objectives?  3) Are contractors managing to achieve cost objectives?  These questions 
were written to analyze CAIV’s success at the DoD level (see Table 1). 
CAIV specific questions were developed to gain insight into the third objective.  
Given that we are approximately 10 years beyond the formal introduction of CAIV to 
DoD, the time is right to conduct this study to see if CAIV has enable programs to set and 













Table 1.  OSD’s CAIV Metrics and Observables (Kaminski, 1995) 
Are cost objectives defined and consistent 
with requirements programmed and 
projected fiscal resources? 
- Out-year resources identified?  ($) 
- Production and O&S cost objectives 
included in the RFP? 
- Key tradeoff issues addressed?  (e.g., in 
COEA) 
Is DoD managing to achieve cost 
objectives? 
- RFP contains a strict minimum number of 
performance specifications?  (#) 
- CP-IPT functioning; tradeoff space 
identified in program baseline and RFP? 
- Risks to achieve cost objectives identified 
and program steps to address these 
defined?  (risk plan) 
- Incentives for achieving cost objectives 
included in the RFP and contract? (% 
relative to total contract $'s) 
- Mechanism for contractor suggestions to 
reduce production and O&S costs in place 
and operating? 
- Allocation of cost objectives provided to 
IPTs and key suppliers 
- Measurement and estimation of reliability 
and maintainability 
- Robust contractor incentives plan in 
place? 
Are contractors managing to achieve cost 
objectives? 
- Providing appropriate tools for cost-
performance tradeoffs (including incentives 
for corporate management) and participates 
in cost-performance tradeoff process 
- Identifying (and when appropriate 
implements) new technologies and 
manufacturing processes that can reduce 
costs 
- Identifying procedural/process 
impediments to cost reduction measures 
- Establishing strong relationship with 
vendor base, including sound incentives 
structure 
 
Research scope   
This research focuses on whether ASC’s acquisition professionals believe their 
programs and contractors are setting and maintaining cost objectives.  Hopefully, this 
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undertaking will enhance the knowledge base of senior OSD and Air Force leaders and 
program managers within the acquisition field. 
Methodology 
This is a qualitative research.  Data were collected using interviews and literature 
review.  Consistent with OSD’s CAIV Metrics and Observables, the interviews focused 
on whether ASC’s acquisition professionals believe their programs and contractors are 
setting and maintaining cost objectives and also the practitioners’ perspective of CAIV in 
general.  The preferred method for conducting interviews was in person, however, there 
were occasions where the telephone worked best.  Literature review was conducted to 
provide historical synopsis of DoD acquisition, present CAIV’s principles, provide a 
description of CAIV’s flagship programs, and explore what I have found to be CAIV’s 
greatest challenge.  The literature reviewed consisted of books, DoD instructions, the 
Internet, periodicals, briefings, and reports. 
Implications 
In addition to the research objectives of the thesis, I hope inferences can be made 
to see if CAIV was a fad that has suffered the same fate as several past DoD initiatives, 
or has it become a valuable institutional tool.  This will add to the ongoing studies 
attempting to improve the DoD acquisition system. 
Preview 
Chapter two is used to build the foundation from which this research is launched.  
The first section of chapter two focuses on the historical perspective of DoD acquisition.  
The second section discusses the environment from which CAIV was born.  The third 
explores CAIV’s principles.  The fourth provides a description of CAIV’s original 
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flagship programs.  To conclude the literature review, I will present CAIV’s greatest 
challenge.  Chapter three discusses the methods used to gather and analyze the data 
collected.  It also illustrates the limitations of the model used to interpret the data 
collected.  Chapter four provides a report of the research findings.  Chapter five provides 
conclusions, recommendations, and limitations as they apply to the stated research 
objectives. 
Summary 
This chapter provided an introduction to the world of CAIV.  The primary focus 
of this research is to determine if ASC has fully adopted CAIV by seeing if ASC’s 
acquisition professionals believe their programs and contractors are managing to set and 
maintain cost objectives.  This research also seeks to capture the practitioners’ 
perspective of CAIV.  To complete these tasks, ASC’s employees were interviewed using 
the reformatted version of “CAIV’s Metrics and Observables” and the questions 
specifically developed to capture the practitioners’ perspective of CAIV.  Interviews and 
literature review will be the primary instruments used to gather information, which 
carries certain assumptions and limitations. 
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II. Literature Review 
Introduction 
 This chapter presents a synopsis of topics important to this research.  It begins 
with a historical perspective of DoD acquisition.  Within this section, the background 
from which current acquisition practices and CAIV came from is shown.  Second, we 
will take a look at the environment leading up to the initiation of CAIV.  Third, we 
narrow the focus of this research by taking a close look at CAIV and its principles.  
Fourth, a description of each of CAIV’s original flagship programs is presented.  Last, we 
will explore CAIV’s greatest challenge. 
Historical Perspectives  
This subchapter presents an historical overview of US military acquisition.  Since 
the beginning of recorded history, nations have wrestled with acquiring technology to 
protect their interest (borders, natural resources, etc).  This responsibility is usually 
undertaken by the warfighting component.  Not surprisingly, we have seen this occur 
within the US and the following paragraphs seek to divide US military acquisition history 
into identifiable periods. 
Pre-Civil war 
It is evident from a number of pre-civil war military biographies that the major 
military mission during this time was pioneering (opening the West for settlement).  
Soldiers needed firearms, uniforms, transportation, and lodging to undertake this 
endeavor.  The government provided funds and quartermasters expended the 
appropriations.  The Navy made large purchases during this period, for example, the 
procurement of six frigates in 1794. 
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Civil War  
During this period there were several military developments, which still impact 
the way we currently acquire systems.  At the beginning of the Civil War, both sides were 
evenly matched and knew each other’s tactics.  This provided the perfect environment 
and need to develop instruments of war.  The military mindset, at this time, was to bring 
overwhelming firepower to the battlefield to subdue the enemy.  This mentality ensured 
the development or improvement, and acquisition of balloons, ironclad ships, breach 
loaders, cartridge rounds, repeating rifles, gatling guns, and submarines for military 
purposes.  The cost of the civil war attributed to both governments (north and south), 
estimated by Goldin and Lewis (1975), in 1860 dollars totaled $3.3 billion.  With that 
much money in circulation and a way of life at risk, the prices the military paid were 
increased significantly from pre-war levels.  Vendors became aware of the fact that the 
military would pay incredibly high prices for equipment they badly needed. 
World War I (WWI) 
WWI “The Great War” ushered in several alterations to weapon system 
acquisition.  The most influential was the use of cost-plus fixed fee contracts.  This 
contract type came about after the government tried using cost-plus percentage of cost, 
which was abused by some industry partners.  The offenders inflated their raw material 
cost ensuring a greater percentage of fee and therefore profit.  On the war front, US and 
Allied troops faced newly developed Axis weapons.  This required acquisition personnel 
to understand the threats and develop/acquire counter systems, which in most cases had 
to be mass-produced.  Mass production of airplanes, tanks, ships, and other major 
weapon systems became a key factor in sustaining and finally winning the war.   
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World War II (WWII) 
Leading up to WWII most civilian and military leaders saw the need to enhance 
the US Military air power.  The US Army Air Corps, at this time, was significantly 
inferior to its European counterparts.  The resulting transformation of the Air Corps 
posed a significant challenge to military acquisition.  Prior to WWII the aircraft industry 
was immature and produced highly customized military planes.  In fact, in 1939 most of 
the planes with which the United States would fight with in WWII had not even been 
developed (Wilbur, 1999).  Expanding the Air Corps became an even more stressful task 
to the acquisition community when Congress authorized the procurement of up to 6000 
aircraft along with necessary logistics.  There was even talk by President Roosevelt that 
the US was going to produce 50,000 planes a year.  In addition to procuring planes for 
the Army Air Corps, military acquisition personnel were busy developing new ships for 
the Navy and tanks for the Army. 
WWII provided the acquisition community with two noteworthy challenges.  
First, there was a conscious effort by acquisition personnel to equip troops with the latest 
technology.  Several industry leaders suggested achieving the goals set forth by President 
Roosevelt and Congress was only achievable if aircraft designs were completely locked 
down -- no changes would be permitted.  DoD recognized this could be a detriment to 
troops because they would not have the latest technology at hand.  How could production 
demands for the war be met while allowing changes to be made on the production line?  
A compromise was made in the form of modification lines.  After a plane came off the 
standard production line it was then sent to a modification area where it was updated with 
the latest technology.  
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Second, aeronautical research became a focus within the US.  Before the war, no 
significant research was accomplished to further aviation technology within the US.  The 
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics did a small amount of work to advance 
fundamental research prior to the war.  It was appropriated $2 million each year, and had 
500 employees (Wilbur, 1999).  This investment in aeronautics research during and after 
the war later enabled the US Air Force to become a prime power within Air and Space.    
Cold War 
The Cold War is often cited as lasting for 41 years, from the late 40s to the early 
90s.  The nation had just exited WWII and military and civilian leaders realized the 
conversion of “plowshares” into “swords” during time of war would no longer be 
sufficient to deter potential enemies.  It was also apparent that the ad hoc methods used 
by acquisition professionals to get the job done during the war could not be maintained.  
There needed to be a robust and efficient acquisition system with standardized 
procedures.  However, money was still being authorized to develop almost any new 
defense system that appeared capable of giving the United States a performance 
advantage over any potential adversary (Acker, 1993).  The Cold War period was 
inundated with reforms and initiatives because of the need for a strong defense industry 
and sound acquisition policy coupled with the significant increase in defense spending.  
One of the first major changes occurred when the 1947 National Security Act 
transformed the “National Military Establishment” which consisted of the Departments of 
the Army and the Navy into the DoD.   
During the sixties, DoD underwent numerous acquisition reforms, which are still 
playing an important role in today’s environment.  Most of these initiatives were 
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introduced by then Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara a former industry executive.  
First, the Five Year Force Structure and Financial Plan, now know as the Future Years 
Defense Program (FYDP), was put in place to provide a fiscal summary of resources 
associated with DoD programs.  Serving as the pivot point of the entire defense 
programming system, it grouped all military forces and all defense systems according to 
their principal missions, without regard for Service affiliations (Acker, 1993).  Second, 
the Planning, Programming, Budgeting System, now know as the Planning, 
Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) Process, provided foundational 
processes necessary for the FYDP to work.  The Defense Acquisition Guidebook states, 
“the purpose of the PPBE process is to allocate resources within the Department of 
Defense.”  Establishment of the FYDP led to an integrated and organized DoD financial 
management system.   
When one thinks of the Cold War, nuclear weapons and their devastating power 
comes to mind.  However, it also marks the origin of today’s acquisition system.  The 
acquisition community played a significant role in the jousting match between the US 
and the Soviet Union.  They had the responsibility to conceive, develop, produce and 
store nuclear weapons.  During this period, acquisition professionals also witnessed the 
dramatic increase in military spending to support development of revolutionary new 
supersonic fighter aircraft, nuclear powered ships, and ballistic missiles.  With all this 
activity, acquisition professionals developed many processes and policies, which are still 
being utilized.   
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Post Cold War to Present 
 This period started off with the military being asked to do more with less.  The 
acquisition workforce stepped up to the challenge and demonstrated capabilities they had 
in development.  New stealth technology, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, Global Positioning 
System, and Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems allow the military to perform current 
operations with considerably fewer resources than a few decades ago.  Today’s 
acquisition initiatives are focused on reducing the development to deployment cycle time 
by continuing reliance on commercially developed items, and maintaining the utilization 
of evolutionary acquisition and spiral development. 
Environment Leading up to CAIV   
DoD acquisition has seen great growth over the last 50 years.  This has made the 
system more bureaucratic, which is evident in DoD’s acquisition work force focus on 
policy, rules, centralization, and procedures.  Between 1949 and1993 no less than 16 
major DoD reform commission\initiatives were implemented in an attempt to provide 









Below is a list of major commissions that have looked at DoD’s acquisition process.  
Table 2.  DoD Reform Initiatives (Reeves, 1996) 
1949 Hoover I 
1953 Rockefeller Committee 
1953 Hoover II 
1961 McNamara initiatives 
1970 Fitzhugh Commission 
1972 Commission on Government Procurement 
1976 OMB Circular A-109 
1978 Defense Science Board Acquisition Cycle Study 
1981 Defense Acquisition Improvement Program 
1983 Grace Commission 
1986 Packard Commission 
1986 Goldwater-Nichols 
1989 Defense Management Review 
1993 Section 800 Panel 
1993 National performance review 
 
The environment leading up to CAIV was shaped by several factors.  The 
pressure on the acquisition system to improve provided the perfect window of 
opportunity for launching a cost saving agenda.  The following paragraphs illustrate 
several stressors within the DoD acquisition environment at the time CAIV was 
implemented. 
Political 
The early years of the 90s saw a major push by political leaders to reduce 
government spending and DoD took the brunt of the assault.  Then Presidential 
Candidate, Bill Clinton used the reduction of military spending as a platform item.  Once 
in office, President Clinton’s Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin ordered a “bottom up 
review” of the military.  The review put forward a reduced (less expensive) military 
structure still capable of conducting two major conflicts simultaneously.  The 
Administration also created a Deputy Under Secretary position for acquisition reform to 
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implement sweeping changes.  Politicians tend to gravitate towards the popular ideas 
within their constituencies and it was especially true during the early 90s when the need 
for a large standing military was far from popular. 
With the Cold War over, America looked forward to receiving a significant return 
on the tremendous investment made during the war.  This “peace dividend” was to come 
from reduced military spending. 
Merge or die “last supper” 
At a 1993 dinner hosted by then Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, DoD contractors 
were told to consolidate or face extinction.  With the breakdown of the Soviet Union, 
DoD officials recognized the budget they enjoyed would slowly fade away.  Carrying a 
large defense industry was no longer practical and consolidation was seen as the way to 
maintain critical infrastructure while reducing the overall number of contractors.   
Mil Specs Elimination 
Leading up to the elimination of military specifications and standards there were 
approximately 30,000 MILSPEC and MILSTD documents (McNally, 1197).  These 
specifications and standards were used to ensure performance of military equipment, 
especially when the lives of service members were at risk.  In 1994, former Secretary of 
Defense, William Perry distributed a memorandum titled “Specifications and Standards--
A New Way of Doing Business,” which along with other publications spelled the death 
of unique military specifications and standards.  DoD leadership also saw this as an 
opportunity to save money, which complemented their political agenda.  This removal of 
military specifications and standards was in response to the nation’s unwillingness to 
continue to pay “whatever it cost” for military performance.  As a result, the civilian 
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sector made many improvements to established commercial standards.  Following this 
initiative DoD was able to provides form, fit, and function requirements and contractors 
were able to commence development using the most cost effective methods and latest 
technologies available. 
Lack of results to date 
During the decades leading up to CAIV, DoD made several attempts to improve 
its acquisition system.  Rarely had these attempts at reform been long lasting or effective.  
With frustrating regularity, they failed to fully achieve the desired effect.  Yet, the 
Pentagon indeed is witnessing critical and exceptional changes to the way in which it 
buys its weapons (Harokopus, 2000).  
Organization Change: DoD early to mid 1990s 
The number one factor that dictated change within DoD during the 90s was the 
fact that the United States did not see the need to maintain a large military.  This belief 
was supported by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the superior war winning 
technologies demonstrated in the first Gulf War.  As noted above, the nation had made 
huge investments to attain this position in the world and was now ready to collect “peace 
dividends.”  
Kurt Lewin’s (1951) organization change model (unfreeze, change, refreeze) 
applies perfectly to DoDs transformation during this period.  Through literature review, 
this section of work superimposes Lewin’s (1951) organization change model over the 
period out of which CAIV was produced.  Lewin (1951) proposed that organizations 
undergo change in three distinct stages.  These stages are similar to the physical property 
of water that allows it to go from solid to liquid and visa versa. 
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The first stage of “unfreeze” gets the organization ready to accept change.  This 
process is essential, without it, organizations will instinctively resist change similarly to a 
block of ice.  One approach to unfreezing an organization is to start where the status quo 
is widely looked on as not the way to continue doing business.  Go where there is some 
feeling that things aren't working out right.  That is where it will be more likely that 
change will be accepted (Kent, 2001). 
How did DoD get the organization ready to change and unfreeze the current 
organization?  From the literature reviewed it appears that DoD went after the acquisition 
branch, the segment within DoD where people felt things were not going so well.  Along 
with, several overspending and mismanagement scandals the acquisition community 
faced cost, schedule, and performance problems.  This first stage of organizational 
change was evident in the number of committees chartered to look into the acquisition 
process.  Within DoD, the unfreezing stage begun with the 1986 Packard Commission.  
Note, approximately 38% of major DoD commissions looking at DoD reform from 1949 
to 1993 took place in the seven short years between1986 and 1993.  During this period 






Figure 1: Major DoD Reform Commissions (Chart built from Reeves, 1996) 
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Toward the latter part of the unfreezing stage, within DoD, there was a transition 
towards the second stage of Lewin’s (1951) organization change model, “change.”  
Within this stage, the solutions proposed to the problems in the first stage became 
initiatives.  This was evident especially in the acquisition world.  During the change stage 
(1993-1996), the acquisition community saw approximately 78% of all major acquisition 







Figure 2:  Major Acquisition Initiatives (Chart built from Hanks, 2005) 
A key, but most often overlooked, stage of Lewin’s (1951) organization change 
model is “refreezing”.  Refreezing is the final stage within the model and deals with 
doing something to the organization so the changes (initiatives) from stage two become a 
permanent part of its operation (Kent, 2001).  Refreezing is often overlooked, but it 
would appear DoD gave it considerable thought with respect to the initiation of CAIV.  
DoD established appropriate metrics to assess CAIV’s accomplishments.  They were 
developed to ensure that CAIV’s principles would become a part of the acquisition 
communities’ operating procedures.  By now, you should have realized that the CAIV 
Metrics and Observables are a central part of this research.  They will be reformatted and 
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used to evaluate whether ASC’s acquisition professionals believe their programs and 
contractors are setting and maintaining cost objectives. 
CAIV and its Principles 
 The background presented in chapter one gives the corporate definition of CAIV.  
This section will provide a synthesized account of what I believe CAIV is about.  CAIV 
attempts to provide acquisition professionals a feasible region “the set of points or values 
that the decision variable can assume and simultaneously satisfy all the constraints in the 
problem (Ragsdale, 2004)” from which to make decisions to satisfy cost and performance 
limitations placed on the project by its stakeholders. 
 
Figure 3.  CAIV’s Feasible Region (Kaye et al, 2000)  
CAIV represents a shift within DoD from seeing performance as king to more as 
an equal to cost and schedule.  Prior to the CAIV initiative, Users would convey their 
requirements in terms of performance.  User requirements drove design, which then 
determined cost and schedule.  This process usually resulted in programs being over 
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budget and behind schedule.  With the inception of CAIV, government/industry 
requirement and acquisition professionals now work together to determine how much 
performance the program can afford.  Requirements and cost objectives are considered 
simultaneously and then used to determine design.  For all practical purposes, this 
concept should produce a positive effect on cost and schedule. 
To fully understand CAIV, one should know the principles on which it is based.  
For CAIV to be successful, according to the December 1995 memo from Dr. Kaminski to 
the Secretaries of the military Departments and Defense Agencies and several other key 
CAIV documents, it has to emphasize the following principles: 
Cost Performance Integrated Product Team (CPIPT) 
Program managers must create a strong team representative of all government and 
industry players.  The CPIPT is chartered with the responsibility of making sure all 
decisions concerning cost and performance are made with team concessions.  With that 
said, each team member must possess the authority to make or support critical decisions.  
Most important, the CPIPT must make it a priority to hold regular meetings throughout 
the program’s lifecycle to ensure stability. 
Realistic but Aggressive Cost Objectives 
It is of utmost importance that cost objectives are established early in the 
acquisition process.  However, caution must be taken not to underestimate.  We have 
come to understand Pereto’s Principle as it pertains to system development.  
Approximately 80 percent of a program’s lifecycle cost is decided within the first 20 
percent of its life.  Therefore, sub par estimates may lead to program failure.  The CAIV 
plan should include cost goals for unit production cost and operating and support costs.  
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The unit production cost goal typically would be established for a specified quantity of 
systems and a specified peak production rate.  The O&S cost goal typically would be an 
annual cost per deployable unit (e.g., battalion or squadron) or individual system (e.g., 
ship or missile) (DoD Directive 5000.2, 2003).  Unfortunately, these goals often change 
due to decreased production rates or quantities.  CAIV objectives need to be updated as 
program changes are implemented. 
Risk Management 
Risk management must be an integral part of a program’s activity to achieve cost, 
performance, and schedule objectives set forth by CAIV.  Program partners must jointly 
identify, analyze, and prioritize critical program risks, then periodically review the 
mitigation plan progress (Kaye et al, 2000).  In addition to periodic reviews, risk 
management should be tied to traditional program milestones.  This ensures cost 
objectives established earlier remain feasible as risks are mitigated or realized. 
Appropriate Metrics 
Metrics are used for tracking progress in setting and achieving cost objectives.  
Keeping good metrics allows the program to utilize collected data to make insightful, 
knowledge-based decisions.  Metrics should show relationships between CAIV 
objectives.  This allows programs to optimize objectives that are being met and react to 
the ones drifting away from desired results.   
Provide Incentives 
Providing motivation for government and industry managers to achieve program 
objectives is tremendously important.  The program manager must take steps to put in 
place incentives to reduce cost throughout a system’s lifecycle.  Incentives to contractors 
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should follow the direction set forth by federal regulations in the form of incentive fees, 
award fee, and favorable performance reports.  Programs must also consider providing 
appropriate incentives, because an incentive that works well for one group may not work 
for another.  Therefore, incentives must be diverse and tailored to fit the situation.  For 
example, a company might prefer award fees vis-à-vis sharing the savings. 
To ensure program success, incentives must also be provide to government 
program managers.  I tried to understand how this is done using literature review.  
However, not much is written on this topic.  Incentives primarily come in the form of 
performance appraisals and future assignments.  On the other hand, rewards come in the 
form of recognition ceremonies, plaques, and letters. 
CAIV’s Flagship Programs Summary 
A cursory review of the flagship programs led to the conclusion that several 
external factors have impacted their implementation of CAIV.  Most of the flagship 
programs became victims of their status, because they were seen as CAIV flagship 
programs they continued despite cost, schedule, and performance shortfalls.  
DoD releases cost, schedule, and performance details on major defense 
acquisition programs to Congress on a quarterly basis.  These details are presented in the 
Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs).  The latest release of this report, September 2005, 
featured six of the eight flagship programs, Air-to-Air Missile Upgrade (AIM-9X), 
Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS), Space Based Infrared System 
(SBIRS), the Joint Air to Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM), the Evolved Expendable 
Launch Vehicle (EELV), and the Joint Advanced Strike Technology (JAST) now known 
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as the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), or F-35.  The information below will provide a synopsis 
of the information contained in the SAR for each of the six programs. 
The report shows the following (fiscal year 2005 in millions) 
Table 3.  CAIV’s Flagship Programs SAR information 
Program Change in Cost 
Change in 
Quantity 




AIM-9X -$194.40 93 -6.6 Production 
MIDS $263.70 117 12.3 Production 
SBIRS $6,490.80 0 154.8 Production 
JASSM -$337.70 -453 0.2 Production 
EELV $14,426.50 -43 179.5 Production 
JAST/JSF, F-35 $25,617.60 -408 24.8 System Development 
 
As Table 3 shows, AIM-9X seems to be the only program of the reporting 
flagship programs with a positive cost relationship.  The others appear to be failing.  To 
provide insight into the flagship programs’ capabilities a description of each is presented 
below. 
The programs selected to be DoD’s CAIV flagships were done so to serve as 
change agents.  These pilot programs had the task to demonstrate how this initiative 
could contribute to the goals and objectives of DoD programs.  DoD decided on eight 
programs, two from the Army, two from the Navy, and four from the Air Force.   
The Army programs selected were the Army Tactical Missile System- Brilliant 
Antitank Pre-Planned Product Improvement (ATACMS BAT P31) and the Crusader 
(155mm self-propelled howitzer).  The Navy programs selected were AIM-9X and 
MIDS.  The Air Force programs selected were SBIRS, JASSM, EELV, and F-35. 
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ATACMS BAT P31 (Block IIA) 
ATACMS BAT P31 provides an autonomous deep-attack capability for the 
ATACMS Block II missiles.  The Brilliant Antitank (BAT) portion of this weapon 
provides a self-guided, anti-armor, top attack submunition, which uses acoustic and 
infrared sensors to autonomously locate, attack, and destroy moving tanks and other 
operating armored vehicles.  The Pre-Planned Product Improvement (P3I) portion 
provides enhanced acquisition capability and an improved warhead for use against an 
expanded target set to include moving, stationary, hot, or cold targets.  
 
Figure 4.  ATACMS BAT P3I (United States Army Field Artillery School) 
Crusader 
The Crusader or Advanced Field Artillery System encompasses a 155mm self 
propelled howitzer and a re-supply vehicle.  The primary mission of this weapon system 
is to provide artillery fire on targets identified by various sensors.  It automatically 
propels 155mm rounds, at a rate of 10-12 per minute, up to 50km.  The Crusader can hit a 
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target with eight rounds almost simultaneously by using its digital firing system to 
calculate the firing solution for each round.  
DoD canceled Crusader in 2002 after eight years and about $2 billion invested.  
The main reason for the cancellation, as cited by numerous news articles, was its weight.  
In an interview with Terence Smith of “News Hour with Jim Lehrer”, Secretary 
Rumsfeld stated, “I asked how many C-17s it would take to move 18 Crusader tubes into 
a battle.  And the answer was 60 to 64 C-17's to move 18 Crusader tubes into a battle.  
That's a bucket.  That's half of the entire C-17 fleet.” 
 
Figure 5.  Crusader and Re-supply Vehicle (Federation of American Scientists) 
AIM-9X 
The AIM-9X is the most recent variation of the Sidewinder missile.  The AIM-9X 
Sidewinder is an air-to-air, supersonic, heat-seeking missile, carried by fighter aircraft.  
The AIM-9X has four main parts, an infrared homing guidance section, an active optical 
target detector, a high-explosive warhead, and a rocket motor.  It is compatible with the 
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Figure 6.  AIM-9X (Raytheon) 
MIDS 
The MIDS is a communications terminal that provides Link 16 digital data link, 
digital voice, and tactical air navigation capabilities for fighter aircraft when integrated 
into the host platform.  Link 16 is a Joint and allied digital data link that operates on an 
anti-jam waveform and uses standardized message sets to exchange theater tactical 
information such air tracks, engagement orders, targeting information, and platform 
status (Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, 2003). 
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Figure 7.  MIDS: LVT Low Volume Terminal (rockwellcollins) 
SBIRS 
As stated in the program’s June 2005 Selected Acquisition Report, SBIRS is 
intended to satisfy key requirements delineated in the SBIRS Operational Requirements 
Document dated August 15, 1996, within the available budget and schedule.  SBIRS is an 
integrated system consisting of multiple space and ground elements, with incremental 
deployment phasing, simultaneously satisfying requirements in the following mission 
areas: Missile Warning, Missile Defense, Technical Intelligence, and Battlespace 
Characterization.  The baseline architecture for SBIRS includes two Highly Elliptical 
Orbit sensors and five Geosynchronous Earth Orbit satellites (four operational and one 
spare), in addition to the following ground elements: a CONUS-based Mission Control 
Station and backup, overseas Relay Ground Stations, Multi-Mission Mobile Processors, 
and associated communication links.  The first increment of the SBIRS ground system 
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was certified for operations in December 2001 for the legacy Defense Support Program 
system satellites.  
 
Figure 8.  SBIRS Architecture (United States Air Force) 
JASSM 
JASSM is a joint program with the Air Force as lead.  It is a stealthy air to 
ground, autonomous, long-range, conventional, cruise missile.  This missile provides the 
military the ability to attack both permanent and moveable targets deep within enemy 
territory without putting aircrews in danger.  Global positioning and inertial navigation 
systems provide JASSM the capability to locate designated target within adverse weather.  
Note:  JASSM replaced the Tri-Service Stand-off Attack Missile, which was canceled 
due to escalation of program cost. 
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Figure 9.  JASSM (Lockheed Martin) 
EELV 
The EELV program seeks to reduce government cost to launch space vehicles by 
25 percent.  A key component to the cost savings is the use of common booster and 
engines and simplified launch pads and procedures.  The EELV system includes the 
launch vehicles, infrastructure, support systems, and interfaces.  EELV consists of two 
families of vehicles, the Delta IV and the Atlas V, that include a full range of medium, 
intermediate and heavy-lift vehicles.  EELV is supporting military, intelligence, and civil 
mission requirements in the National Launch Forecast (NLF) through 2020 previously 
serviced by Titan II, Delta II, Atlas II, and Titan IV (Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 2005). 
 29
 
Figure 10.  EELV (United States Air Force) 
JAST “now known as” JSF or F-35 
The JSF Program will develop and field an affordable, highly common family of 
next-generation strike aircraft for the United States Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and 
allies.  The three variants are the F-35A Conventional Takeoff and Landing (CTOL); F-
35B Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing (STOVL); and the F-35C Aircraft Carrier 
suitable Variant (CV).  The CTOL will be a stealthy multi-role aircraft, primary air-to-
ground for the Air Force to replace the F-16 and A-10 (Service intent) and complement 
the F-22A.  The STOVL variant will be a multi-role strike fighter aircraft to replace the 
AV-8B and F/A-18A/C/D for the Marine Corps, and replace the Sea Harrier and GR-7 
for the United Kingdom Royal Navy and Royal Air Force, respectively.  The CV will 
provide the Navy a multi-role, stealthy strike fighter aircraft to complement the F/A-
18E/F (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics, 2005).  
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Figure 11.  JSF (United States Air Force) 
 
CAIV’s Greatest Challenge 
The greatest threat to CAIV is the current focus on initiatives that are driven by 
schedule.  McNutt (1998), PhD dissertation highlighted this challenge to CAIV, “While 
there has been a flurry of acquisition reform activity in recent years, little of this effort 
has been aimed primarily at reducing development time.  The primary aim of the current 
acquisition reform efforts has been focused on lowering costs.”  The 1986 Packard 
Commission acknowledged that, “Unreasonably long acquisition cycles -- ten to fifteen 
years for major weapon systems is a central problem from which most other acquisition 
problems stem.”  The CAIV working group overlooked this fact some nine years later, 
evident in its 1995 CAIV Working Group Report.  The report reads, “CAIV, meaning 
that, once the system performance and objective cost are decided (on the basis of cost-
performance tradeoffs), the acquisition process will make cost more of a constraint, and 
less of a variable, while nonetheless obtaining the needed military capability of the 
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system.”  Clearly, schedule was not viewed as important as cost and performance.  
However, since CAIV’s implementation numerous initiatives have been established both 
at the DoD and Service levels to confront the cost is king mentality.  These initiatives 
seek to establish schedule as a dominant player within DoD acquisition. 
AF Lightning bolt 10 
Former Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Mr. Arthur Money, 
initiated AF Lighting bolt 10, which suggested the reduction of weapon system 
acquisition schedule by 50 percent, in 1996.  This attempt to reduce cycle time quickly 
lost steam and was reworded to focus on reducing the contracting period of the 
acquisition process.   
Lean Aerospace Initiative (LAI) 
The Lean Aerospace Initiative is playing a tremendous part in bringing schedule 
to the forefront of DoD acquisition.  One of the major research streams of the LAI is 
product lifecycle, which according to its charter is, “Pushing the envelope in the area of 
designing and developing aerospace products in a complex system-of-systems 
environment to shorten cycle time, reduce cost and increase delivery of best lifecycle 
value.”  
Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs) 
The Office of the Secretary of Defense established ACTDs to get vital weapon 
systems as expeditiously as possible into the hands of joint and coalition military 
personnel.  The Office of Advanced Systems and Concepts attempts to meet this goal 
according to their website by:  
-- Speeding the discovery, development, and delivery of technology and concepts 
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-- Partnering with Services, Agencies, and Coalition elements 
-- Seeking the very best technical and operational concept solutions from Defense, 
industry and academic sources 
-- Leveraging “try before you buy” demonstrations, exploiting “test to procure” 
initiatives, and forging partnerships to create new technology and operational 
concept solutions 
-- Operationalizing innovative solutions better than anyone else 
Evolutionary Acquisition (EA) 
The EA strategy is use to provide mature, easily developed portions of a 
capability to the field.  Developers are encouraged to provide less than the 100 percent 
solution to DoD within a specified timeframe and then provide the remaining capability 
in increments, as it becomes available.  This came about because the acquisition world 
was spending about 80 percent of development time trying to get the last 20 percent of a 
capability operational.  Think Pereto’s Principle.  As the other 20% mature and new 
requirements developed they are transitioned in to the program in future increments. 
Summary 
 In this chapter, we looked at a synopsis of the material believed important in 
researching CAIV.  It started off with a historical synopsis of DoD acquisition.  A 
background was given to show where today’s acquisition process came from.  Second, 
we looked at the environment leading up to CAIV.  Third, we focused on CAIV’s 
principles.  Fourth, a description of CAIV’s eight original flagship programs was 




The information provided in chapter two proves CAIV’s principles to be a major 
DoD initiative.  It crosses all branches of the military and as the flagship programs have 
shown, a number of different weapon platforms.  In addition, it has been the most 
formidable test to performance centric acquisition.  Continuing the journey, this chapter 
talks about the method and research strategy used to evaluate the research objectives.   
Research Objectives 
1. Do ASC’s acquisition professionals believe their programs are setting and 
maintaining cost objectives?  
2. Do ASC’s acquisition professionals believe their contractors are setting 
and maintaining cost objectives? 
3. What is the practitioners’ perspective of CAIV? 
In addition to the research strategy used, the upcoming paragraphs will discuss 
how the data were collected, analyzed, and the limitations of the method selected. 
Research Strategy 








Experiment how, why? Yes Yes 
Survey 
who, what, where,  
how many,      
how much? No Yes 
Archival Analysis 
who, what, where,  
how many,      
how much? No Yes/No 
History how, why? No No 
Case Study how, why? No Yes 
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Identifying a research strategy is probably the most important aspect of doing 
research.  According to Yin (2003), one must consider the following when deciding 
which strategy to use.  First, the type of research question posed.  This research falls in 
the “how and why” grouping of Yin’s model because of its exploratory nature.  The 
research is focused on how ASC’s acquisition professionals view their programs and 
contractors in respect to setting and maintaining cost objectives.  Second, the extent of 
control an investigator has over the event being studied.  The interviewer within this 
study has no control over CAIV or the individuals being interviewed.  Last, the degree of 
focus on contemporary as opposed to historical events.  This study is focused on real-
time events to decide if ASC acquisition professionals believe their programs and 
contractors are setting and maintaining cost objectives.  Yin (2003) lists the research 
strategies available as experiment, survey, archival analysis, history, and case study.  
This research is a qualitative case study.  This method was selected with the three 
conditions and the strategies Yin mentioned in mind.  This approach allowed a 
comprehensive analysis of the information provided by interviewees.  Interviewees were 
selected from an assortment of programs to ensure the information, from a relatively 
small number of programs, would facilitate generalized conclusions. 
CAIV Metrics and Observables: Program Office  
As stated in chapter one of this research, CAIV Metrics and Observables were 
created to identify important and observable steps which should be implemented in order 
to set and maintain aggressive production and O&S cost objectives.  The DoD created 
Metrics and Observables were reformatted into questions that could be used to explore 
the first two research objectives.  This provided the instrument necessary to evaluate 
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whether ASC’s acquisition professionals believe their programs and contractors are 
setting and maintaining cost objectives.  
 The tables below demonstrate the transformation.  It shows the questions 
fashioned from CAIV’s Metrics and Observables used to explore the first two research 
questions.  
Table 5.  Questions Formatted from CAIV’s Metrics and Observables 
1. Do ASC’s acquisition 
professionals believe their 
programs are setting and 
maintaining cost 
objectives? 
a. Did the RFP(s) contain a strict minimum number of 
performance specifications? 
b. Was the trade space (cost performance tradeoffs) 
identified in the program RFP or program baseline? 
c. Is there a risk plan that identifies risks to achieve cost 
objectives? 
d. Were incentives for achieving cost objectives included 
in the RFP and contract?  (% relative to total contract 
$'s)? 
e. Are there mechanisms in place and operating for 
contractor suggestions to reduce production and O&S 
costs? 
f. Are cost objectives provided to IPTs and key suppliers? 
g. Are there measurement and estimation of reliability and 
maintainability? 
2. Do ASC’s acquisition 
professionals believe their 
contractors are setting and 
maintaining cost 
objectives? 
a. Do they provide appropriate tools for cost-performance 
tradeoffs (including incentives for corporate 
management) and participate in the cost-performance 
tradeoff process? 
b. Do they identify (and when appropriate implement) 
new technologies and manufacturing processes that can 
reduce costs? 
c. Do they identify procedural/process impediments 
(barriers) to cost reduction measures? 
d. Do they establish strong relationships with the vendor 
base, including sound incentives structure? 
 
CAIV Specific Interview Questions 
 Specific interview questions were developed to understand the practitioners’ 
perspective of CAIV.  For example, what do they consider to be the reason(s) for the 
implementation of CAIV?  What do they believe to be CAIV’s strengths and 
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weaknesses?  Do they believe CAIV was properly implemented and what improvements 
would they make?  These represent the type of questions used to explore the third 
objective of this research. 
CAIV Specific Sample Interview Questions 
1. What do you think was the single most important reason for CAIV? 
2. In your opinion, what are CAIV’s strengths? 
3. In your opinion, what are CAIV’s weaknesses? 
4. Do you believe CAIV was properly implemented? 
5. In your opinion, is CAIV being utilized within DoD? 
6. What impact(s) do you believe CAIV had within DoD? 
Data Collection 
Data were collected using the questions formatted from CAIVs Metrics and 
Observable, and the ones specific to CAIV.  Semi-structured interviews allowed for the 
gather of individual perceptions about CAIV and on whether ASC’s acquisition 
professionals believe their programs and contractors are setting and maintaining cost 
objectives.  Present and past situations were capture, which aided in the validity of this 
research.  The interview format offered control over the type of questions and also 
provided interviewees the flexibility to clarify a few perspectives. 
Before data were collected, steps were taken to ensure the right questions were 
being asked.  This is where pilot testing the interview questions came in handy.  Pilot 
testing was conducted using Air Force employees with different acquisition backgrounds.  
Also, individuals from outside the acquisition community helped with question 
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formulation and structure.  The pilot tests provided feedback that were admitted, 
reworked, or rejected based on further clarification. 
With a refined set of questions, approval was required to conduct real interviews.  
Acquiring this came in two forms.  First, interview questions were submitted to the Air 
Force Institute of Technology Human Subjects Research department.  As stated in their 
own words “All investigations, including surveys that involve the collection or use of 
information about Human Subjects must be reviewed.” 
Second, approval was needed from individual program offices to conduct 
interviews.  Programs believed, through research, to contain the workforce that would 
provide substantial input to this investigation were contacted.  No specific permission 
was necessary to conduct interviews as long as the program offices recognized that the 
interviews were gathering information for research.  The front offices of the programs 
contacted were asked to provide contact information for acquisition professionals 
(Engineer, Scientist, Acquisition Manager, Contacting Manager, or Financial manager) 
within their program that would be able to assist me concerning my research. 
A network of individuals willing to be interviewed was constructed.  This was 
done using the above technique, in conjunction with referrals from interviewees as to 
who else within the community should be able to help.  Most of the interviews were 
conducted face-to-face at the interviewee’s workplace.  However, the telephone was 
utilized whenever scheduling or real world situations became a factor.  Interviewees were 
assured that the information they provided would only be seen by a limited number of 
people, mainly my research committee and myself. 
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With their permission, interviewees’ responses were recorded.  Also, a significant 
amount of notes were taken, which were often read back to interviewees to ensure their 
views were accurately captured.  Transcription was accomplished as soon as possible 
after an interview, limiting lost meaning due to time.  Interviewees were shown 
appreciation for taking time to help with this research.  With an abundance of 
transcriptions, data analysis was the next logical undertaking.   
Data Analysis 
 There is no single “right” way to analyze data in a qualitative study (Leedy, 
2005).  However, Creswell’s (1998) data analysis spiral provides an outstanding 
approach to analyzing a large amount of qualitative data.  Creswell’s spiral provides the 
following steps.  First, organization:  Organize the data using any of the many means 
available (databases, binders, containers, etc).  Second, perusal:  Systematically examine 
all data collected to get an understanding of the collection as a whole.  Third, 
classification:  In this step, patterns start to emerge as a result of recognizing common 
trends.  Fourth, Synthesis:  This is where collected data are fused making it presentable to 
intended readers.  This step might include offering propositions or hypotheses that 
describe relationships among the categories (Leedy, 2005).  The spiral was used to 
review gathered data several times.   
Instrument Validation 
The validity of a measurement instrument is the extent to which the instrument 
measures what it is actually intended to measure (Leedy, 2005).  There are different ways 
to gage instrument validity.  Of these ways, two were considered most important to this 
research.  First, face value; how relevant is the instrument to what it was designed to 
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measure at first glance.  Face value increases when experts within the community of 
interest endorse the measurement instrument and when accepted measurements are used.  
As for this research, I believe face value is established by using CAIV’s Metrics and 
Observables to develop the interview question.   
Second, content validity; how pertinent are the questions to the community being 
measured?  Content validity is important when trying to assess people’s achievement in 
some area.  A major portion of this research is to gauge, from the interviewees’ 
perspectives, the achievements of ASC’s programs and contractors to set and maintain 
cost objectives.  A significant portion of the instrument used in this research was 
developed from identifiable indicators that illustrate whether programs and contractors 
are managing to set and maintain cost objectives. 
Limitations of Methodology 
In addition, to the benefits stated earlier, the qualitative case study format carries 
several limitations.  Case studies cannot be controlled, which is a significant threat to 
internal and external validity.  Concrete conclusions cannot be made concerning the 
relationship between an event and its cause.  Specifically to this research, one might ask 
two questions.  Were the right people selected as interviewees, and was the researcher 
able to interpret and synthesize the knowledge gain from the data collected? 
First, were the right people contacted?  To minimize the impact of this limitation, 
interviewees were taken from different acquisition backgrounds.  Being an acquisition 
professional was the only requirement, which is considered necessary to conduct a study 
of this type.  Second, did the researcher accurately interpret the data?  To minimize the 
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disruption here, other researchers were asked to verify that the analysis and synthesis of 
the data were acceptable. 
Summary 
 This chapter provided the methods used within this research to get a grasp on the 
research objectives.  This research was accomplished using the qualitative case study 
approach.  Interviews and Creswell’s spiral were used to collect and analyze data 
respectively.  Acquisition professionals were selected to serve as interviewees through 
referrals.  In addition to CAIV specific questions, interview questions were also 
formatted from CAIV’s Metrics and Observables.  With data collected, the next steps are 
to identify themes and report findings. 
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IV. Data Analysis 
Introduction 
 Chapter three presented the methodology used within this research to collect 
relevant data.  This chapter builds on previous chapters by identifying and grouping the 
overall themes expressed in the interviews into common ideas.  Creswell’s (2003) spiral, 
described earlier, provided the structure for data analysis.  This chapter provides a 
foundation from which the interview questions can be synthesized to support the overall 
conclusions presented in five. 
Demographics 
 The acquisition professionals interviewed include ASC’s military and government 
civilian employees.  The military members ranged from the rank of Captain to Colonel.  
The civil servants ranged from General Schedule (GS) grade13 to 15.  The acquisition 
experience of both groups spans from two to 34 years with an average of 15.5 years.  
These professionals worked in programs of various sizes (acquisition level).  Limited 
demographics were collected because the purpose of this research is directed toward the 
overall perspectives of ASC’s acquisition professionals and not to draw conclusions 
based upon differences between participants. 
Data Analysis 
Analysis of the first two parts of this section classified themes into a positive or 
negative category in respect to the investigative questions.  This was done to determine if 
ASC’s acquisition professionals believe their programs and contractors are setting and 
maintaining cost objectives.  Also, some interviewees’ viewpoints are presented if they 
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provide further insight into the research questions.  The result from the analysis of each 
question is presented below the research objective it supports. 
The final part of this section will discuss themes developed from the analysis of 
participants’ responses to the questions used to understand the practitioners’ perspective 
of CAIV. 
Research Objective 1:  Do ASC’s acquisition professionals believe their programs 
are setting and maintaining cost objectives?  
To provide an answer to the question above, interviewees were asked questions 
focused on indicators, which showed whether they believe their programs are setting and 
maintaining cost objectives.  Again, these indicators were identified by the CAIV 
working group and developed into CAIV’s Metrics and Observables. 
The first question (Table 3, question 1a) within this section focused on whether 
programs are minimizing the amount of specific performance parameters by providing 
only form, fit, and function requirements to contractors.  This approach allows DoD 
contractors to use the most cost effective methods and newest technologies available 
during system development.  As discussed in chapter two, having unique military 
requirements may suggest the military is willing to pay any amount for a particular 
capability. 
Analysis of question (1a) showed roughly 92% of all interviewees believed 
attempts have been made to limit detailed performance specifications, moving more 
towards capability based acquisition.  While, 8% of the participants believed programs 
are not limiting the amount of specific requirements imposed on contractors. 
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The second question (Table 3, question 1b) was developed to identify if programs 
are establishing the trade space between cost and performance early within its lifecycles.  
One interviewee stated, “I have come to understand this (cost-performance trade space) 
as the options available to us based on cost.  Just as in purchasing a car, each model 
provides different capabilities and it is up to the buyer to make the appropriate tradeoffs.”   
Analysis of question (1b) showed about 70% of all interviewees believed program 
stakeholders understand the trade space in respect to cost and performance.  As one 
interviewee stated, "Even though they [Users] know and want the current state of the art 
capabilities for their systems, they understand only some will be doable considering 
cost."  On the other side of the coin, 30% believed there is not a noticeable attempt by 
programs to identify the cost-performance trade space. 
The third question (Table 3, question 1c), used to support whether ASC’s 
acquisition professionals believe their programs are setting and maintaining cost 
objectives, focused on risk management.  As discussed in chapter two, risk management 
is one of CAIV’s most visible principles.  In addition to a positive or negative theme, the 
analysis of this question provided several important professional viewpoints, which 
illustrated how risk is managed at the program level.  The number one perspective 
interviewees expressed was the belief programs that manage risk successfully, by being 
proactive and staying within cost, fear losing their savings to poorly managed/failing 
programs.  The second viewpoint interviewees put forward is the belief that risk planning 
has become much more common over the last ten years.  The third illustrates the 
importance of cost within the risk management process.  One interviewee stated “if cost 
is red [program is over budget] then the entire program is red…cost is now king” 
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Analysis of question (1c) showed approximately 73% of all interviewees believed 
programs have developed adequate risk plans, which identify pitfalls to achieving cost 
objectives.  Whereas, 27% of the individuals interviewed believed programs are failing to 
manage risk associated with cost. 
The fourth question (Table 3, question 1d) focused on the ability of programs to 
provide appropriate incentives to contractors to achieve cost objectives.  Analysis of this 
question exposed that programs that are failing to develop creative incentives to get work 
done within constraints.  One interviewee explained, “the government pays contractors 
regardless, five years turn into 10, at which point contractors blame requirement creep for 
the overruns in cost and schedule.”  This interviewee and many like him believed 
contractors have little to no incentive to develop and field a system within cost or on 
schedule. 
Analysis of question (1d) showed just about 62% of all interviewees believed 
DoD programs are providing appropriate incentives for defense contractors to achieve 
cost objectives.  Whereas, 38% believed programs are not providing appropriate 
incentives to ensure capabilities remain affordable.   
The fifth question (Table 3, question 1e) used in the interviews tried to understand 
if programs have mechanisms for contractors to make suggestions that could reduce 
production, operations, and sustainment costs.  A very positive example came from the 
analysis of this question.  There seems to be a continued drive by contractors to locate 
common configurations between systems.  These commonalities allow the use of 
common parts and procedures, reducing overall cost.  One interviewee pointed to a 
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situation where his contractor identified a part being developed for the Navy could also 
be used as an Air Force system component. 
Analysis of question (1e) showed approximately 89% of all interviewees who 
answered this question believed programs have mechanisms in place, which allow 
contractors to put forward suggestions that could reduce production and operations and 
sustainment cost.  While, 11% believed the opposite is true, programs are not providing 
avenues for contractors to suggest ideas that could reduce these costs. 
The sixth question (Table 3, question 1f), employed to determine whether ASC’s 
acquisition professionals believe their programs are setting and maintaining cost 
objectives, tried to ascertain whether programs are providing cost objectives to their 
Integrated Product Teams and key suppliers. 
Analysis of this question (1f) suggested about 75% of the individuals interviewed 
believed cost objectives are provided to product teams and key suppliers, either actively 
or passively.  One interviewee pointed to the cost cutting drills, the Air Force periodically 
conducts, as one of the delivery tools used by upper management to get cost objectives 
down to product teams and eventually to suppliers.  The other 25% believed programs do 
not provide cost objectives to IPTs and key suppliers.  
The last question (Table 3, question 1g) in this segment strived to understand if 
ASC’s programs are estimating and measuring reliability and maintainability of their 
systems.  Several of the interviewees pointed to the fact ASC along with DoD have 
finally realized that the majority of a program’s cost is realized in the latter years of its 
lifecycle.  To reduce this expense, a renewed focus has been placed on understanding the 
cost associated with reliability and maintainability through the use of improved 
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measuring and estimating tools and practices.  While analyzing this question, one such 
practice became a recognizable viewpoint, staggered reliability, this is educating Users to 
the fact that obtaining 95% reliability off the production line is very unlikely and an 
evolutionary or spiral approach should be used. 
The analysis of question (1g) showed 86% of the interviewees responded 
positively to whether programs are accomplishing measurements and estimations of their 
systems’ reliability and maintainability.  While 14% believed the opposite is true.   
Research Objective 2:  Do ASC’s acquisition professionals believe their contractors 
are setting and maintaining cost objectives?   
The analysis above strongly indicates that ASC’s acquisition professionals believe 
their programs are setting and maintaining cost objectives.  However, what about ASC’s 
contractors?  Are they managing to set and maintain cost objectives as seen by the 
acquisition professionals within ASC?  To obtain answers to these questions, 
interviewees were asked questions which focused on indicators that point to whether 
ASC’s contractors are setting and maintaining cost objectives.   
The first question (Table 3, question 2a) of this section focused on whether 
contractors have the right tools to conduct appropriate cost-performance tradeoffs and if 
they participate in the cost-performance tradeoff process.  The viewpoints which became 
most visible, from the interviewees' responses to this question, was the massive amount 
of effort contractors put forward when they realize the government is serious about cost.  
As one interviewee declared, “the "A Team" is usually assigned to participate in cost-
performance tradeoffs if the budget is capped.”    
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Analysis of question (2a) showed roughly 86% of all interviewees believed 
contractors have the right tools to conduct appropriate cost-performance tradeoffs and 
participate in the cost-performance tradeoff process.  While, 14% believed the opposite is 
true, DoD contractors do not possess the tools to conduct cost-performance tradeoffs and 
they do not participate in the cost-performance tradeoff process. 
 The second question (Table 3, question 2b), used to support whether ASC 
contractors are managing to set and maintain cost objectives, tried to discover if 
contactors are identifying new technologies and manufacturing processes that may reduce 
costs. 
Analysis of question (2b) showed about 68% of all interviewees believed 
contractors understand the importance of identifying cost reducing manufacturing 
processes.  Interviewees mentioned that contractors are introducing manufacturing 
management techniques and new technologies early in the acquisition process.  On the 
other side of the coin, 32% of the interviewees collectively believed contractors only 
watch their bottom line.  How much profit can we make?  Therefore, they think that 
contractors will utilize the manufacturing practices and technologies, new or old, which 
provide them the greatest chance for potential profit.  
The third questions (Table 3, question 2c) focused on ASC’s contractors’ ability 
to identify procedures/processes that impede cost reduction measures.  A participant 
perception, which came through during analysis of this question, was the use of 
information technology has enabled the reduction and in some cases the elimination of 
outdated and underutilized government imposed processes and procedures.  The analysis 
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of this question also revealed that contractors are pushing to reduce and or combine the 
number of formal (procedural) system tests. 
Analysis of question (2c) suggested just about 73% of all interviewees believed 
ASC contractors are identifying procedures/processes that impede cost reduction 
measures.  Whereas, the other 27% believed contractors are not identifying barriers to 
cost reduction measures.   
The final question (Table 3, question 2d) in this section sought to understand 
whether contractors have established strong relationships with their vendor base.  An 
observation made while analyzing this question was a majority of ASC’s contractors have 
established an open line of communication with their suppliers.  As one interviewee 
stated, “They [ASC's contactors] work well with third parties.  They understand that 
communication is important and push constantly to make sure it is kept open.”  
The analysis of question (2d) showed about 78% of the interviewees responded 
positively to whether contractors are establishing strong relationships with their vendor 
base, while, the other 22% responded negatively. 
Research Objective 3:  What is the practitioners’ perspective of CAIV? 
The first two research questions used indicators from CAIV’s Metrics and 
Observables to investigate whether ASC’s acquisition professionals believe their 
programs and contractors are setting and maintaining cost objectives.  Within this section, 
the analyses and findings associated with the interview questions developed to obtain the 
practitioners’ perspective of CAIV are discussed.  A practitioner of CAIV is an individual 
who utilizes some or all of CAIV's principles on a regular basis. 
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As stated in chapter three, data were collected using semi-structured interviews 
and analyzed with Creswell’s (2003) spiral model.  The data from the interviews 
generated themes, which are listed below each finding in order of frequency.  The main 
theme that emerges from each interview question is reported as a finding.  A finding is 
used as a building block to support the overall conclusion of the practitioners’ perspective 
of CAIV in chapter five. 
Finding One:  Most practitioners report budget constraint as the single most 
important reason for the implementation of CAIV 
One of the questions asked during the interviews focused on what practitioners 
believed was the most important reason for DoD's implementation of CAIV.  Analysis of 
this question brought to light three main themes. 
Budget Constraints was the number one reason reported as to why CAIV was 
implemented.  As one interviewee stated “Everything was costing too much money and 
cost was still growing.  CAIV was the tool which was needed to take control of cost, as 
does the civilian sector.”  A few interviewees mentioned requirement creep and unique 
military specifications were the main contributors to the soaring costs before CAIV’s 
implementation. 
The second theme, which came up as a reason for the implementation of CAIV, 
was the disappointing success rate of traditional programs.  Pre-CAIV attitudes supported 
pursuing the last five to 10% of a system’s performance to the detriment of the program. 
The last major reason for implementing CAIV, as reported by interviewees, was 
to formalize the cost-performance process that was already being done by program 
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managers.  Interviewees who presented this theme believed CAIV is just codified 
common sense. 
Finding Two:  Practitioners report CAIV’s most significant strength is its 
ability to force stakeholders to look at the entire program upfront 
 Practitioners were asked to express what they believed to be CAIV’s strong 
points.  These answers are important because it identifies positive features of a major 
DoD initiative.  The analysis of this question showed that CAIV's primary strength is its 
ability to compel stakeholders to take an early look at the entire program.  One 
interviewee summarized her thoughts with the following, "CAIV makes you take an early 
look at the system's lifecycle requirements.  Users now fully understand the cost and not 
just requirements.  CAIV forces them to look at the cost of their requirements" 
 The theme that manifested itself as CAIV's second strongest strength is its ability 
to provide program insight to IPT members.  One interviewee stressed he firmly believes 
IPTs are the best thing DoD has established within the last 10 years.  IPTs are seen as 
important because they include all stakeholders and give the program manager and their 
supporting staff the go ahead to use their intellect.  All program issues are placed on the 
table and openly discussed. 
 The other less frequent themes, which surfaced as CAIV’s strengths, are its 





Finding Three:  Practitioners report CAIV’s greatest weakness is the 
expectation it will fix all problems within a program   
 To understand the weaknesses of CAIV, interviewees were asked to identify what 
they consider to be CAIV's weak points.  The most frequently reported weakness is the 
expectation by program stakeholders that CAIV will remedy all issues.  As one 
practitioner stated, "CAIV is expected to fix all problems, but the concept does not work 
without communication.  The saying is now "we are going to CAIV this away" whenever 
problems occur."  Another made the point by saying "CAIV is used as a walking stick.  It 
does not work the same way for all programs.  It must be tailored and not viewed as a 
substitute for perfection.” 
 The other prime perceived weaknesses of CAIV were reported with almost equal 
frequency.  These include, (1) lack of ability to rapidly deploy new technology, (2) 
providing contractors with a tool to trim capabilities, and (3) not capitalizing on its initial 
momentum. 
Finding Four:  Most practitioners report CAIV as properly implemented  
The fifth question, used to obtain the practitioners’ perspective of CAIV, focused 
on whether they believe it was properly implemented or not.  Analysis of the answers to 
this question showed 38% of all interviewees believed CAIV was properly implemented.  
Leadership support played a large part in CAIV implementation success.  A mid-level 
civil servant expressed this when he stated, “because they [DoD senior leadership] knew 
we had to do something [about the acquisition process] CAIV became the central focus.”  
On the other side of the coin, 29% of the interviewees believed CAIV was not properly 
implemented.  5% believed the implementation depended on the size of the program.  
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One senior military program manager summed it up well when he said, “CAIV is 
properly implemented on small programs but not on bigger ones.  Large programs with 
the political backing are not willing to give up capability for cost.  These programs seem 
to be immune to cuts, while smaller programs are seen as bill payers for large programs 
overruns.”  Lastly, 29% of the participants had no comment regarding this question. 
Finding Five:  Most practitioners report CAIV as being utilized within DoD 
The sixth question within this section attempted to determine the practitioners’ 
views of whether CAIV is being utilized within DoD.  If CAIV’s practitioners believe it 
has lost its utility, then other tools must be developed to set and maintain DoD cost 
objectives. 
Analysis of this question showed 57% of participants believed CAIV is being 
utilized within DoD.  However, a few pointed to the reality CAIV is less recognizable by 
name.  On the other hand, 29% of interviewees believed CAIV is not being utilized by 
DoD as a whole, it is only used by a small number of programs which are tightly 
constrained by their budget.  14% of the practitioners interviewed had no comment on 
this question.  
Finding Six:  Most practitioners report CAIV has significantly impacted the 
way programs view cost management     
The seventh question, employed to gauge practitioners’ perspective of CAIV, was 
designed to capture the noticeable impacts of CAIV on the DoD.  Three main themes 
became apparent and are listed below in frequency of occurrence. 
Participants reported making programs more conscious of cost management as 
CAIV's number one impact on the DoD.  As one middle manager stated, “CAIV brought 
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to light that the DoD acquisition process is driven by cost… you can easily make five 
days into 10 and reduce mach 2.5 to 2, however you can not make one million into two.  
Money is our most limiting resource.”  
The next distinct theme that presented itself, as a significant impact of CAIV on 
DoD, was CAIV’s ability to tie all the phases of a program’s acquisition lifecycle 
together.  For example, one practitioner said, “CAIV makes us look at the program as a 
whole not in segments.  It has allowed us to get away from the old mentality which made 
the acquisition community believe development had nothing to do with sustainment.” 
 The third theme that came up, during analyzing the answers for this question, was 
that CAIV has impacted the DoD by providing it with a bumper sticker slogan.  
Interviewees pointed to its memorable name and how this small acronym attempts to 
simplify the gigantic DoD’s acquisition process.  
Summary 
This chapter synthesized the data collected into overall themes and findings.  
Through analysis of the questions formatted from CAIV’s Metrics and Observables, it 
appears there is a positive likelihood that ASC’s acquisition professionals believe their 
programs and contractors are setting and maintaining cost objectives. 
Six findings surfaced from the analysis of the interview questions developed to 
gain a glimpse into the practitioners’ perspective of CAIV.  These findings along with the 
themes identified in the first two sections and my personal observations and synthesis of 
the information collected will provide the foundation to develop the conclusions and 
recommendations presented in chapter five. 
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations 
Introduction 
The objectives of this research are to determine whether ASC’s acquisition 
professionals believe their programs and contractors are setting and maintaining cost 
objectives.  Also, this work seeks to understand the practitioners’ perspectives of CAIV.  
This chapter presents the conclusions drawn based on assessment of the themes and 
findings identified in chapter four.  It also provides recommendations, which will 
hopefully improve the CAIV process.  Lastly, recommendations for future research and 
limitations to this research are presented. 
Conclusions 
 This section is divided into three parts.  The first two discuss the conclusions 
drawn from the answers given by participants to determine if ASC’s acquisition 
professionals believe their programs and contractors are setting and maintaining cost 
objectives.  The third part illustrates the conclusions drawn from the questions developed 
to gauge CAIV’s practitioners’ perspectives. 
Research Objective 1:  Do ASC’s acquisition professionals believe their 
programs are setting and maintaining cost objectives? 
To provide a conclusion to research objective one, we looked at the results 
obtained from the analysis of the investigative questions.  This was done to determine if 
there were positive or negative trends, which might suggest whether or not ASC’s 
acquisition professionals believe their programs are setting and maintaining cost 
objectives.  Based on the total number of positive to negative responses to the 
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investigative questions (see Table 4), it appears a majority of ASC’s acquisition 
professionals believe their programs are managing to set and maintain cost objectives.    
Table 6.  Are DoD Programs Setting and Maintaining Cost Objectives Themes 
Total number of questions answered by interviewees 150  
Total Number of Positive Reply 117 78% 
Total Number of Negative Reply 33 22% 
 
Research Objective 2:  Do ASC’s acquisition professionals believe their 
contractors are setting and maintaining cost objectives?   
As was done above, the answers to the investigative questions presented in 
chapter four were looked at to determine if there were positive or negative trends, which 
might suggest whether or not ASC’s acquisition professionals believe their contractors 
are setting and maintaining cost objectives.  Based on the total number of positive to 
negative responses to the investigative questions (see Table 5), it appears a majority of 
ASC’s acquisition professionals believe their contractors are setting and maintaining cost 
objectives.  
Table 7.  Are DoD Contractors Setting and Maintaining Cost Objectives Themes 
Total number of questions answered by interviewees 86  
Total Number of Positive Reply 66 77% 
Total Number of Negative Reply 20 23% 
 
Research Objective 3:  What is the practitioners’ perspective of CAIV? 
The following paragraphs provide conclusions based on interpretation of the 
information participants provided during the interview process.  First, a conclusion of 
CAIV’s practitioners’ perspectives is presented.  Last, a discussion of several conclusions 
that presented themselves during synthesis of the collected data is presented.  
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Practitioners’ Perspectives of CAIV 
The following information was gathered from the findings presented in chapter 
four.  They represent the acquisition professionals’ perspectives of CAIV.  This research 
concludes that CAIV’s practitioners perceive CAIV to be beneficial with proper 
implementation and support.  They understand CAIV’s creation was due to a time when 
reform was necessary.  The Cold War had ended and the nation did not see the need to 
maintain a military with the capabilities needed during that war.  Simply, cuts had to be 
made and CAIV provided the principles for this task.  Practitioners validated this 
occurrence by reporting budgetary constraints as the number one reason for the 
implementation of CAIV.  CAIV is recognized as providing program offices the 
opportunity to include all stakeholders in the acquisition process, forcing them to 
understand the consequences of their decision over the life of the program.  It also 
provides the boundaries in which system acquisition is done.  Funding has become a 
greater concern over the last 10 years and CAIV has challenged industry to provide war-
winning capability under tough budget constraints.  The practitioners interviewed also 
perceive CAIV as having several weaknesses.  The greatest weak point presented by 
interviewees was the expectation that CAIV will fix all issues within a program.  This has 
negatively affected CAIV’s image because, has practitioners reported, there seems to be a 
tendency by programs to apply the CAIV bandage without tailoring it to specific 
situations, which might make problems worse.  Practitioners perceive CAIV to be 
properly implemented.  CAIV has filtered down to every appropriate level within the 
DoD acquisition system.  This is evident by the majority of interviewees’, from three 
years to 34 years of acquisition experience, awareness of CAIV and its general purpose.  
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Most practitioners perceive CAIV as being utilized within DoD based on the significant 
impact it made on the way programs view cost management.  Given the budget constraint 
of the 90s, CAIV provided programs the principles necessary to set and maintain cost 
objectives in an attempt to keep weapon systems affordable.  CAIV has been well 
received by DoD acquisition professionals, evident in the findings presented in chapter 
four.  However, through observation and synthesis of the interview responses, a few 
unexpected practitioners’ perspectives presented themselves as conclusions.   
First, there are modest incentives for DoD programs to implement CAIV; the 
funds saved are used to pay bills not associated with the program that realized the 
savings.  Second, limited accountability is placed on programs to utilize CAIV; no 
liability is attributed to programs, which goes against CAIV’s principles.  Third, CAIV 
has lost most of its momentum; even though the principles are in use as demonstrated by 
research objectives one and two, it seems the name is becoming an empty shell.  Fourth, 
the DoD substitutes “budget” for “cost” in CAIV.  Programs usually start out using sound 
CAIV principles but after the initial funding, programs usually erode into build to budget 
due to funding cuts.  In this situation, programs are provided a budget based on funds 
available and not on the requirements to successfully execute.  Last, a window of 
opportunity might be on the horizon to reintroduce a new and improved CAIV.  Current 
world engagements are very expensive.  How long will the American public continue to 
support the redirection of funds from domestic programs to pay for capabilities necessary 
to conduct the Global War on Terrorism?  Also, a renewed cost focused initiative is 
needed to prevent cuts to the military’s forces to pay for modernization. 
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There are no incentives for DoD programs to implement CAIV  
During the interviews, participants pointed out the apparent disincentives to 
employ CAIV’s principles within their programs.  Many mentioned occurrences where 
the projected cost savings were seized from the program and given to other under funded 
or mismanaged programs.  In some cases, the savings didn’t materialize leaving the 
program office short.  Interviewees also reported that some programs annual budgets 
where reduced by the exact amount of cost savings realized the year prior.  There seems 
to be a substantial disincentive associated with cost reduction efforts within the DoD. 
Limited accountability placed on programs to utilize CAIV  
CAIV seems to be missing the accountability piece, which is necessary to make 
an initiative totally successful.  Programs will disregard the downward directed CAIV 
requirements placed on them if these requirements are not actively managed for 
accountability.  A senior GS employee stated, “I have not seen a CAIV plan within the 
years I have been here and you would think it would be a main requirement for programs 
to transition to the next phase in the acquisition cycle.” 
CAIV has lost most of its momentum 
The majority of interviewees believe the introduction of CAIV to DoD was well 
received and supported by senior leadership.  Several of the senior employees 
interviewed mentioned the abundance of training opportunities and workshops, which 
existed during the first few years of CAIV’s initiation.  A few of these interviewees were 
responsible for briefing and communicating the importance of CAIV to their 
organizations.  These activities show the intensity of CAIV’s initial momentum.  
However, a number of the interviewees believe CAIV has failed to maintain its original 
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momentum.  As one interviewee declared, “It [CAIV] has not capitalized on its initial 
momentum.  Currently it is losing the grasp it had on the acquisition community.”  
Another stated, “It [CAIV] has lost its momentum, it no longer holds the engineering and 
acquisition communities together.” 
DoD programs have substituted Budget for the Cost in CAIV 
The current DoD budget process became a central discussion within many of the 
interview sessions.  Several practitioners pointed to how DoD allocates funds.  They 
believe DoD allocates funds based on the budget they have available and not on the 
estimates/cost developed by stakeholders utilizing CAIV’s principles.  This type of 
budgetary practice reduces the leverage gained by program offices during the negotiation 
and interaction with contractors and stakeholders.  Programs are forced to manage the 
system with the budget available and not the funding necessary to effectively reap the 
benefits of the tradeoffs made earlier.  One interviewee expressed, “CAIV is being used 
informally by Program Managers as a tool to put a cap on cost while failing to follow the 
entire CAIV process.” 
The following paragraph provides a simplified description of how a funded 
program ends up building to a DoD imposed budget.  The request for funds commence 
when a Major Command identifies needed capability.  The Major Command then submits 
a request to the DoD, which is flowed up into the President’s budgets and then to 
Congress.  Congress authorized and appropriated funds which are provided to the DoD 
on an annually basis.  The money is flowed to the program office chartered, by the 
requesting Command, to develop a system that provides the needed capability. 
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The distance between Congress and the program office is where this problem 
occurs.  By the time the funds reach the program office it has gone through several levels 
of bureaucracies each with “unexpected bills” that need to be paid.  Therefore, the 
original cost that was sent up to Congress after several layers comes back as a budget 
below what is necessary to properly manage the program. 
A window of opportunity might be on the horizon to reintroduce a new and 
improved CAIV 
The current Global War on Terrorism is very expensive and budget constraints 
might lead to renewed interest in CAIV.  As chapter two illustrated, the need for CAIV 
came after the nation was no longer willing to finance the military at Cold War levels and 
senior military leadership had to devise a technique to maintain capabilities with less 
funding.  This might be the reality we are exposed to again in a few years.  How long can 
the nation sustain the current war effort?  The signs to look for were also mentioned in 
chapter two, Kurt Lewin’s (1951) organization change model (unfreeze, change, 
refreeze).  First, unfreeze; Congress and the military will form several commissions to 
understand if DoD is expending funds in the most efficient manner.  Second, change; 
there will be several changes proposed to assist DoD with its perceived spending 
inefficiency.  This is where a new and improved CAIV should be reintroduced to DoD.  
Last, refreeze; attempts will be made to solidify the changes through the use of training, 
workshops, and leadership support.  The precursors to change within DoD are becoming 
visible.  Several interviewees pointed to Congress shifting its stands from commercial-
off-the-shelf procurement to military development due to recent scandals.  This illustrates 
legislators dissatisfaction with the way DoD is currently conducting business.  A senior 
 61
Program Manager expressed his thoughts on the change to come as, “we might be going 
back towards unique military requirements and away from commercial practices.”   
This opportunity might also present itself to aid in the modernization of US 
military forces.  Modernization is also expensive and the trend to accomplish this is 
usually reducing end-strength.  Reintroducing a program like CAIV will focus the 
military to look at not only reducing the end strength but also the cost effectiveness of 
current high dollar programs. 
Recommendations 
This subchapter will provide recommendations as they pertain to the five 
unexpected practitioners’ perspectives mentioned above.  These recommendations are 
geared toward DoD leadership with the authority to make changes to policies and 
procedures.  The ideals put forth within this study are done so with the optimism they 
will make improvements to the well-received CAIV initiative. 
First, how to provide incentives for programs to use CAIV’s principles to achieve 
savings?  The suggestion that comes to mind is to change the impression that a program’s 
savings often benefits some other organization.  This can be accomplished by giving the 
program, which realized the savings, the option to use all or a percentage of the funds 
within their program or offer the savings to another cause.  This approach empowers the 
program and the contractor because it plays a significant role in the decision of how the 
savings are utilized.  If a program selects to retain the savings, it will be able to contribute 
additional funds toward the completion of the system, which will get new capabilities to 
the field earlier than predicted.  This “incentive money” can also be expended to pay for 
approved but unfounded requirements. 
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Second, how can accountability be designed into the CAIV process?  
Policymakers must hold program managers responsible by developing rigorous and 
comprehensive guidelines that are employed annually to assess a programs’ ability to set 
and maintain cost objectives.  This should be a key portion of Air Force and DoD 
inspections.  Inspectors should use the guidelines as a checklist to see if programs are 
utilizing CAIV principles.  Additionally, a program’s ability to set and maintain cost 
objectives should be a major factor in determining if it is ready to transition to the next 
phase within the acquisition cycles. 
Third, how can CAIV regain lost momentum?  The reduced momentum is a result 
few incentives and no accountability in combination with faltering leadership support.  
Implementing the recommendations above for incentives and accountability along with 
increased senior leadership support will swing the momentum back toward CAIV.  Once 
programs see the new changes and focus, they will begin to employ CAIV’s principles, 
which will result in the recovery of the lost momentum. 
The fourth recommendation, if accepted, will be the hardest to implement because 
of established procedures and the level changes will need to take place.  The way DoD 
appropriates its acquisition budget must be overhauled for programs to achieve the full 
benefits of CAIV.  Funds must be appropriated based on the level determined by 
stakeholders during the initial cost-performance trade-off working groups.  If a program 
cannot be continuously funded then it might be prudent to delay until the appropriate 
funding is available.  This guaranteed funding would provide programs additional 
bargaining power and leverage with their contractors. 
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Last, how can CAIV take advantage of the approaching window of opportunity 
for a cost focused initiative?  The recommendation here is to form a partnership between 
CAIV and other currently high profile initiatives, such as Evolutionary Acquisition and 
Spiral Development.  A hybrid of these initiatives can be easily created, by combining the 
sound program management and cost aspects of CAIV with the schedule focused 
characteristics of Evolutionary Acquisition and Spiral Development.  CAIV’s alliance 
with its greatest challenge, schedule/cycle-time, will benefit DoD because this union will 
force DoD acquisition professionals to focus on system cost and schedule in relation to 
performance. 
Limitations of this Research 
Above the limitations of the methods used to collect data, discussed in chapter 
three, there are limitations to this research as a whole.  First, the interviewees were all 
from one of DoD’s many product centers.  This might introduce findings that are 
localized and cannot be generalized to the entire acquisition community.  Second, the 
sample size is a relatively small portion of DoD’s acquisition professionals.  Third, the 
outsider perspective from other stakeholders within the acquisition process such as 
contractors and individual users was not solicited.  These professionals might have a 
different perspective regarding the research questions. 
Recommendations for future research 
 While conducting this research, it became apparent additional study will need to 
be undertaken to finish the portrait this work started.  First, quantitative research tools 
should be developed to provide additional support to the findings and conclusions this 
research found.  Second, this study should be conducted within other DoD product 
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centers to determine if the findings and conclusion are supported by other DoD 
organizations.  Third, perform a detailed analysis of CAIV’s original flagship programs 
to understand the external forces that might be responsible for their seemingly poor 
performance.  Last, interview DoD contractors for their perspective on CAIV and other 
cost saving DoD initiatives. 
Discussion 
 This research was developed to understand if ASC’s acquisition professionals 
believe their programs and contractors are setting and maintaining cost objectives.  It was 
also conceived to present the practitioners’ perspectives of CAIV.  This work used 
literature to illustrate the foundation of today’s acquisition system to, discuss the 
environment from which CAIV was born, explore CAIV’s principles, provide a 
description of each of CAIV’s flagship programs, and recognize CAIV’s greatest 
challenge.  Data were collected and analyzed using proven well-researched methods such 
as Creswell’s (2003) analysis spiral. 
 This research adds to the body of work being done to comprehend the ever-
changing DoD acquisition system, enhancing the knowledge base of DoD acquisition 
professionals.  Additionally, this study provides insight into a long serving DoD initiative 
that has been relatively successful considering the political DoD budgetary system. 
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